Genericness Doctrine Need Not Apply: Employing Generic Domain Names in Cyberspace. by Lee, C. Kim
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 14 Volume XIV 
Number 4 Volume XIV Book 4 Article 6 
2004 
Genericness Doctrine Need Not Apply: Employing Generic Domain 
Names in Cyberspace. 
C. Kim Lee 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
C. Kim Lee, Genericness Doctrine Need Not Apply: Employing Generic Domain Names in Cyberspace., 14 
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1093 (2004). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol14/iss4/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Genericness Doctrine Need Not Apply: Employing Generic Domain Names in 
Cyberspace. 
Cover Page Footnote 
The editors and staff of IPLJ and Professor Stephen W. Feingold 
This note is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal: 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol14/iss4/6 
LE FORMAT 8/6/2004 4:15 PM 
 
1093 
Genericness Doctrine Need Not Apply:  
Employing Generic Domain Names in 
Cyberspace 
C. Kim Le* 
 
INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................1094 
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF DOMAIN NAMES .........................1098 
A. Traditional Trademark Analysis of Domain Names ..1100 
B. Administrative Treatment of GDNs ...........................1105 
II. UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW AND GENERIC TERMS.............1108 
A. Hope in the Second Circuit for Generic Marks .........1109 
B. The Vanity Phone Number Paradigm ........................1110 
III. THE APPLICATION OF TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
PRINCIPLES TO GDNS.........................................................1115 
A. Breaking Down and Sizing Up GDNs .......................1117 
1. Approaches to How GDNs Can Be Analyzed ....1117 
2. GDNs as Generic Marks Overall?.......................1119 
3. GDNs as Descriptive Marks................................1120 
4. Arbitrary or Suggestive GDNs............................1121 
B. GDNs Behaving Anticompetitively ............................1122 
IV. FAIR PLAY IN CYBERSPACE: A PROPOSAL FOR GDN 
PROTECTION.......................................................................1124 
A. Cause of Action for GDN Holders .............................1126 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2004; B.A., University of 
Virginia, 1999.  Managing Editor, Vol. XIV, Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & 
Entertainment Law Journal.  The author greatly appreciates the dedication of the editors 
and staff of the Journal in bringing this Note to publication.  She also thanks Professor 
Stephen W. Feingold for his suggestions and insight, which inspired this Note. 
LE FORMAT 8/6/2004  4:15 PM 
1094 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 14:1093 
1. Establishing Substantial Secondary Meaning .....1127 
2. Finding Signs of Confusion.................................1127 
 a) Limitations on GDN Protection .....................1128 
 b) Confusion by Offline Competitors.................1132 
B. Fashioning an Equitable Remedy ..............................1133 
CONCLUSION............................................................................ .1134 
INTRODUCTION 
The domain name <business.com> was auctioned for an 
unprecedented $7.5 million;1 <loans.com> was sold for $3 
million;2 and <wine.com> fetched $2.9 million.3  The domain 
name <sex.com> is rumored to be worth at least $250 million.4  
Hotels.com invested close to $55 million in an advertising 
campaign launched on broadcast and cable networks.5  What all of 
these costly domain names have in common is that they are short, 
easy to remember, and extremely valuable branding tools for e-
businesses.6  The Wall Street Journal’s last tally in 2000 revealed 
 
1 Lee Gomes, Today, Ventures Pick Names That Are Short and Have Global Ring, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2003, at A13. 
2 Loans.com Web Address Auctioned for $3 Million, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2000, at B6. 
3 Gail Robinson, You Paid How Much for That Domain Name?, Web Developer’s 
Journal, at http://webdevelopersjournal.com/articles/domain_names.html (Feb. 3, 2000) 
(providing a list of some of the most expensive domain names).  Another example of a 
high priced domain name is <autos.com>, which was sold to an online car sales company 
for $2.2 million. See id.; Robert Frank, How Music.com Found Itself a Hot Address, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2000, at B1.  Additionally, an entertainment company recently 
bought the domain name <men.com> for $1.3 million. See Associated Press, Domain 
Names Once Again Fetch Top Dollar (Dec. 25, 2003), available at  CNN.com, 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internet/12/25/internet.domains.ap (last visited Apr. 12, 
2004). 
4 See, e.g., Jon Swartz, Sex.com Ownership Ruling Expected: Domain Name Hotly 
Disputed, USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 2000, at 3B (stating that the adult entertainment network 
built around the <sex.com> domain name is estimated to be worth at least $250 million 
by some pornography executives). 
5 See Brian Steinberg, Ads Target Stay-at-Home Travelers, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2003, 
at B6. 
6 See Jason Black, What’s In a Name?, INTERNET WORLD, July 15, 2001, at 20 
(illustrating that the domain name <salary.com> is a self-branding company name), 
available at 2001 WL 8972673.  The Chief Executive Officer and founder of 
<salary.com> advises that successful branding should involve selecting domain names 
that are “‘memorable, short to type, and easy to spell.’” Id. 
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that nearly ninety-eight percent of the words in Webster’s English 
Dictionary are registered as domain names.7 
Just when it seemed that all hope was abandoned for businesses 
that entered into cyberspace, American consumers spent a 
staggering $18.5 billion online during the 2003 holiday season.8  
The typical American Internet user visited fifty-five domain names 
at home and ninety-nine at work on average during the month of 
December alone.9  Moreover, analysts predict that online sales may 
total up to $65 billion this year and swell by 17 percent over the 
next 5 years, reaching a whopping $117 billion by 2008.10 
What all of these statistics and exorbitant dollar amounts 
represent are consumers’ rapidly growing reliance on the Internet11 
and a surge of opportunities for American businesses in 
 
7 Rhea Wessel, ‘Dot.coms’ Furnish English Language with German-Like Gigantic 
Names, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2000, at B17D. 
8 Press Release, Nielsen//NetRatings, Online Consumers Spent $18.5 Billion During 
2003 Holiday Season, According to the Goldman Sachs, Harris Interactive and 
Nielsen//NetRatings Holiday ESpending Report (Jan. 5, 2004), available at 
http://www.nielsennetratings.com/news.jsp (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).  Online holiday 
spending jumped thirty-five percent from the 2002 season. Id. 
9 Cyberatlas.com, U.S. Web Usage and Traffic, December 2003, at http://cyberatlas.-
internet.com/big_picture/traffic_patterns/article/0,,5931_3301321,00.ht-ml (last updated 
Jan. 27, 2004) (citing a Nielson//NetRating report in 2003). 
10 Matt Hines, Report: Online Shopping Still A-Hopping, CNET News.com, at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1030-5143637.html (last modified Jan. 20, 2004) (citing a 
report by Juniper Research).  Over the next five years, the average amount spent by the 
online consumer may reach $780 annually. Id.  Moreover, the number of people making 
purchases online will reach sixty-seven percent before showing signs of slowing down. 
Id. 
11 In March 2004, it was reported that the number of Americans who have access to the 
Internet from the home increased to 204.3 million, or nearly 75 percent of the population, 
up 9 percent from just a year ago. See Press Release, Nielsen//NetRatings, Three Out of 
Four Americans Have Access to the Internet, According to Nielsen//NetRatings (Mar. 18, 
2004), available at http://www.nielsennetratings.com/news.jsp (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).  
Women now also represent a higher proportion of at-home Web surfers.  A 
Nielsen//NetRatings analyst attributes this to the fact that “[w]omen make the majority of 
purchases and household decisions[, thus,] it’s no surprise that they are utilizing the 
Internet as a tool for daily living.” Id. (citations omitted).  In addition, the worldwide use 
of the Internet has grown significantly over the last several years. Nua.com, How Many 
Online?, at http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how_many_online/index.html (last visited Apr. 6, 
2004).  In September 2002, Internet users worldwide totaled 605.6 million. Id.  This 
number is more than triple the number of Internet users in the world in September 1999, 
which was only 201.05 million. Nua.com, Worldwide, at http://www.nua.ie/surveys/-
how_many_online/world.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2004). 
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cyberspace.  With thousands or even millions of dollars at stake, e-
companies understandably want to protect their online endeavors.12  
And branding may be the key to surviving online.13  Yet, because 
generic domain names (“GDNs”)14 contain generic terms, causes 
of action premised on federal trademark infringement and unfair 
competition are likely to be limited, or foreclosed altogether, for e-
companies that hold GDNs.15 
Foreclosing such avenues of protection on the grounds of 
genericism ignores the unique nature of domain names.  Unlike 
traditional marks, domain names are unique because there can be 
only one user of any given domain name.16  This fact alone urges a 
closer look at GDNs before courts rigidly apply the rules of 
genericism to bar avenues of protection.  Although GDNs contain 
generic terms, they are not classifiable as generic marks overall.17  
 
12 See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Cyberproperty and Judicial Dissonance: The Trouble 
with Domain Name Classification, 10 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 183, 186–90 (2001) 
[hereinafter Nguyen, Cyberproperty and Judicial Dissonance] (discussing the rising 
value of domain names that contain generic terms). 
13 Professor J. Thomas McCarthy explained the importance of the branding: 
Both consumer and producer would fare badly in a world without the 
distinguishing function served by trademarks.  If there were no way to tell good 
products from the poor products, why bother to sell anything but the poorest?  
When a consumer is faced with competing products and services from which he 
can choose, there must be some system of trade symbols that identify and 
distinguish each competitor’s wares . . . . 
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3:5, at 
3-4 (4th ed. 2003). 
14 As used in this Note, a domain name that contains a generic term is referred to as a 
generic domain name (“GDN”).  A GDN includes both the second-level domain (“SLD”) 
and the top-level domain (“TLD”).  For further discussion of SLDs and TLDs, see infra 
Part I.B. 
15 See, e.g., Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce: Move Over 
Inherently Distinctive Trademarks—The E-Brand, I-Brand and Generic Domain Names 
Ascending to Power?, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 937, 962–69 (2001) [hereinafter Nguyen, 
Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce] (suggesting that GDNs never will be entitled to 
trademark protection). 
16 E.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 
1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that each Web page must have a unique domain name); 
InterNIC.net, The Domain Name System: A Non-Technical Explanation – Why Universal 
Resolvability Is Important, at http://www.internic.net/faqs/authoritative-dns.html (last 
updated Oct. 5, 2002) [hereinafter InterNIC.net, A Non-Technical Explanation] 
(explaining that identical domain names cannot function within the domain name 
system). 
17 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
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As cyberspace continues to grow exponentially,18 so do the 
possibilities of competitors in the same industry who adopt 
“parasitic,” or confusingly similar, domain names in order to free 
ride on the branding and goodwill developed by successful GDN 
holders.19  GDN holders, who have invested extensive time, 
money, and energy in their businesses, deserve protection against 
such unfair trade practices.20  In addition, consumers who have 
come to depend on the services provided by these well-known e-
companies should not be subjected to the deception created by the 
use of parasitic domain names.21 
This Note will reveal that the scope of trademark and unfair 
competition law under the Lanham Act22 is sufficiently broad so as 
to provide protection to GDNs, notwithstanding the prejudice of 
the genericness doctrine against generic marks.23  Specifically, this 
 
18 In December 2003, the net total of registered domain names worldwide containing 
the TLDs, “.com,” “.org.,” and “.net,” summed 32,894,380, representing a growth in the 
millions within just one year. Zooknic Internet Intelligence, History of gTLD Domain 
Name Growth, at http://www.zooknic.com/domains/counts.html (last visited Apr. 12, 
2004).  At that same time, 2,025,045 domain names with the relatively new TLDs, “.biz” 
and “.info,” were registered worldwide. Id. 
19 See, e.g., Nick Wingfield, Internet Companies See Value in Misaddressed Web 
Traffic, WALL ST. J., Sept. 5, 2003, at B1 (illustrating how new e-companies set out to 
capitalize on Internet users who mistype Web addresses); Ira S. Nathenson, Comment, 
Showdown at the Domain Name Corral: Property Rights and Personal Jurisdiction Over 
Squatters, Poachers and Other Parasites, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 911, 927–29 & n.66 (1997) 
(describing the problem of parasitic registrations of domain names that are confusingly 
similar to well-known marks and providing some examples of disputes between parasitic 
domain name registrants and owners of the corresponding well-known marks). 
20 See discussion infra Part IV. 
21 See id. 
22 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2000).  This Note focuses on the confusion created by 
competitors that attempt to capitalize on established GDNs within the same industry.  For 
this reason, the potential resolution arising from trademark dilution law, which provides a 
cause of action regardless of inter-industry competition and likelihood of confusion, is 
outside the scope of this Note. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining dilution). 
23 The Third Circuit outlined the genericness doctrine in A.J. Canfield Co. v. 
Honickman: 
The genericness doctrine prevents trademarks from serving as the substitutes 
for patents, and protects the public right to copy any non-patented, functional 
characteristic of a competitor’s product.  Trademark law seeks to provide a 
producer neither with a monopoly over a functional characteristic it has 
originated nor with a monopoly over a particularly effective marketing phrase 
[unless] it is necessary to enable consumers to distinguish one producer’s goods 
from others and even then only if the grant of such a monopoly will not 
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Note will argue (1) that the unique character of GDNs justifies a 
reevaluation of the law to protect against the use of confusing 
similar domain names and (2) that GDNs should be protectable 
upon a substantial showing of secondary meaning and a likelihood 
of confusion to Internet consumers.  Part I will discuss the current 
state of protection granted to domain names according to the 
policies of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).  It 
will focus on GDNs and how the genericness doctrine operates to 
preclude their protection.  Part II will examine the Second Circuit’s 
deviating treatment of traditional generic marks with respect to 
unfair competition claims.  It also will discuss case law involving 
vanity phone numbers, which are frequently analogized to domain 
names.  Part III will assemble the established principles of law and 
apply them in the context of GDNs.  Finally, Part IV will propose a 
federal claim for GDN protection and fashion an appropriate 
remedy for prevailing GDN holders. 
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF DOMAIN NAMES 
Trademarks have moved substantially away from their limited 
role as indicators of physical origin24 and are now viewed as 
necessary (1) to ensure consumers’ rights not to be confused25 and 
(2) to protect the expenditures, time, and energy of trademark 
owners in creating and developing goodwill.26  The Lanham Act 
generally provides federal trademark protection for “any word, 
name, symbol, or device” that is adopted and commercially used 
 
substantially disadvantage competitors by preventing them from describing the 
nature of their goods. 
808 F.2d 291, 305 (3d Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). 
24 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 3:8, at 3-17 to 3-18 (describing the early view of 
trademarks as indicating a source of physical origin).  As trademark law developed, the 
courts relaxed their rigid view of trademark function and regarded trademarks as 
indicating a single source. Id. § 3:9, at 3-18 to 3-19. 
25 Section 32(a) of the Lanham Act provides, in pertinent part, that “any reproduction, 
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark . . . which such use is likely 
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . shall be liable in a civil action 
by the registrant . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a)–(b). 
26 See, e.g., 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 2:2, at 2-3 (referring to a company’s right to 
enjoy the fruits of its investments in the goodwill and reputation of its mark (citing Nat’l 
Color Labs., Inc. v. Philip’s Foto Co., 273 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967))). 
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by a company to distinguish its goods and services from those of 
others.27  Under section 32(1) of the Lanham Act (“Section 
32(1)”), the infringing use of a “registered mark” that is likely to 
cause public confusion is liable in civil action.28  A mark is 
registrable on the USPTO’s principal register unless it is used in 
connection with goods that are “merely descriptive.”29  Therefore, 
a mark that is deemed merely descriptive is neither eligible for 
principal register registration nor shielded against presumptively 
infringing use.30 
According to section 2(f) of the Lanham Act (“Section 2(f)”), 
however, a company may register a descriptive mark on the 
principal register if it later can prove that the mark has become 
“distinctive.”31  In the meantime, descriptive marks may be 
registered on the USPTO’s supplemental register under section 
23(a) of the Lanham Act if they are “capable of distinguishing the 
applicant’s goods or services,” though they are not accorded full-
fledged trademark status.32 
 
27 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
28 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). 
29 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e); see Application of Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 F.2d 549, 551 
(C.C.P.A. 1968) (stating that one test to determine whether a mark is “merely 
descriptive” involves asking what the mark “would mean to the potential consumer when 
applied to applicant’s goods”).  Registration on the principal register is only prima facie 
evidence of the validity of a trademark. See infra note 32.  An additional showing must be 
made that the trademark is “use[d] in commerce.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 
30 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1052(e).  For a discussion of the principal and supplemental 
registers, see infra note 32. 
31 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (finding that evidence that a mark has become distinctive 
includes “proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark by the 
applicant in commerce for the five years before the date on which the claim of 
distinctiveness is made”); see also 1-3 JEROME GILSON & JEFFREY M. SAMUELS, 
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 3.04[6][b][i], at 3-130.25 (2003) (explaining 
that if a descriptive mark has “become so closely associated with a mark owner’s product 
or service it may be held to be distinctive and, therefore, registerable”). 
32 15 U.S.C. § 1091(a).  The principal register differs from the supplemental register in 
that it confers certain substantive and procedural advantages that are not afforded to 
supplemental register registrations. See 1-3 GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 31, § 3.04[3], 
at 3-100.  For example, registration on the principal register “communicates nationwide 
constructive notice, constitutes prima facie or conclusive evidence of the exclusive right 
to use the mark in interstate commerce, [and] becomes incontestable under certain 
circumstances . . . .” Id. § 3.04[3][a], at 3-100.  These advantages do not exist for marks 
registered on the supplemental register. Id.  Registration on the supplemental register, 
however, offers other benefits, such as “notice of the registrant’s claim of rights to 
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The next sections discuss the traditional requirements that 
domain names must meet to be eligible for Section 32(a) standing.  
Trademark registration often hinges on the level of the mark’s 
distinctiveness.33  The classification of GDNs as generic marks, the 
lowest level of distinctiveness, negatively impacts their chances of 
making it on either the principal or supplemental register.34  
Because the USPTO chooses to examine GDNs as generic marks, 
GDNs are almost always doomed.35 
A. Traditional Trademark Analysis of Domain Names 
Domain names currently must meet the same two requirements 
to merit protection as do traditional trademarks and service 
marks:36 (1) they must serve as a source identifier; and (2) they 
must be distinctive.37  As to the first requirement, “a domain name 
can become a trademark if it is used as a trademark.”38  The dual 
nature of domain names—one as business names and the other as 
locators on the Internet39—slightly complicates the matter.  As 
locators, domain names are the easiest method by which Internet 
 
anyone who searches the Patent and Trademark Office records.” Id. § 3.04[3][c], at 3-102 
to 3-103. 
33 See infra Part I.A. 
34 See infra Parts I.A–.B. 
35 See infra Part I.B.  Occasionally, GDNs make it on the supplemental register. See In 
re Martin Container, Inc., No.75/533,426, 2002 TTAB LEXIS 566, at *4–*5 (Trademark 
Trial & App. Bd. Sept. 4, 2002) (on reconsideration) (pointing out that <books.com> and 
<officesupplies.com> are registered on the supplemental register, but that the TTAB is 
not bound by the prior decisions of trademark examining attorneys). 
36 Domain names are generally considered service marks because they represent 
services available online. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 7:17.1, at 7-28 to 7-29.  
According to the Lanham Act, service marks are treated in the same way as trademarks: 
“service marks shall be registrable, in the same manner and with the same effect as are 
trademarks, and when registered they shall be entitled to the protection provided in this 
chapter in the case of trademarks.” 15 U.S.C. § 1053 (2000). 
37 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 3:1, at 3-2 (explaining that the function of a 
trademark is to identify the source of the goods and to distinguish the goods from others 
on the market). 
38 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 7:17.1, at 7-25. 
39 See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 956 (C.D. 
Cal. 1997) (observing that domain names “present a special problem . . . because they are 
used for both a non-trademark technical purpose, to designate a set of computers on the 
Internet, and for trademark purposes, to identify an Internet user who offers goods or 
services on the Internet”). 
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users can find Web sites.40  Rather than memorizing a Web site’s 
Internet protocol address, which consists of a string of numbers, 
Internet users simply can type in a convenient domain name.41  
According to the district court in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 
Network Solutions, Inc., when domain names are “used only to 
indicate an address on the Internet, [they are] not functioning as a 
trademark.”42  Domain names must do more than route Internet 
users to the appropriate Web sites in order to merit protection—the 
domain name must identify the source of the goods or services.43  
The Lockheed court suggests, therefore, that the utilitarian nature 
of a domain name cannot give rise to trademark status unless the 
domain name is telling of the particular e-business that is offering 
the goods or services.44 
Relevant to the second requirement of traditional trademark 
analysis is the “spectrum of distinctiveness,” which identifies five 
categories of marks that vary in terms of protection: fanciful, 
arbitrary, suggestive, descriptive, and generic.45  The first three 
categories of marks—fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive—receive 
immediate protection upon adoption and use because they are 
presumed to be inherently distinctive and capable of identifying 
the source.46  In cases where the distinctiveness of the domain 
name turns on the distinctiveness of the corresponding traditional 
 
40 See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 
1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A specific web site is most easily located by using its domain 
name.”). 
41 See Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 952 (describing the structure of Internet protocol 
numbers). 
42 Id. at 956. 
43 See id.; U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE [TMEP] § 1209.03(m) (3d ed., rev. 2, 2003) (stating that “[a] mark 
comprised of an Internet domain name is registrable as a trademark or service mark only 
if it functions as an identifier of the source of goods or services”). 
44 See Lockheed, 985 F. Supp. at 956. 
45 See, e.g., Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9–11 (2d Cir. 
1976) (identifying only four main categories of marks by collapsing fanciful and arbitrary 
into one category).  There is a distinction between fanciful and arbitrary terms, and some 
courts have referred to them as two separate categories. See, e.g., Butcher Co. v. 
Bouthout Constr., Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 750, 754 (D. Me. 2001); Majestic Drug Co. v. 
Olla Beauty Supply, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 0046, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 900, *8 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 29, 1997). 
46 See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10–11; 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 15:1, at 15-5. 
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trademark from which it was adopted, determining which category 
the domain name falls under is easy.47  For instance, because the 
traditional trademark “MovieBuff” for computer software 
providing entertainment-related information is suggestive of its 
product, its matching domain name <moviebuff.com> likewise 
would be considered inherently distinctive by a court.48  In this 
context, however, e-companies that adopt domain names as their 
primary business names must undergo classification analysis based 
solely on their domain names. 
Descriptive marks do not gain protection unless the mark 
holder can show secondary meaning.49  Descriptive marks 
“‘forthwith convey[] an immediate idea of the ingredients, 
qualities or characteristics of the goods.’”50  Secondary meaning is 
the concept that some marks, although not inherently distinctive, 
can become “uniquely associated with that person’s goods, service, 
or business” in the public’s mind.51  Judge Arthur Carter Denison 
of the Sixth Circuit best articulated the doctrine of secondary 
meaning in 1912: 
It contemplates that a word or phrase originally, and in that 
sense primarily, incapable of exclusive appropriation with 
reference to an article on the market, . . . might nevertheless 
have been used so long and so exclusively by one producer 
with reference to his article that, in that trade and to that 
branch of the purchasing public, the word or phrase had 
come to mean that the article was his product; in other 
words, had come to be, to them, his trade-mark.  So it was 
 
47 See, e.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 
1036, 1046–47, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 1999). 
48 See id. at 1041, 1058–59.  The Ninth Circuit disregarded the “.com” component in 
<moviebuff.com> and concluded that the “moviebuff” component was identical to the 
plaintiff’s traditional trademark, “MovieBuff.” Id. at 1055. 
49 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2000) 
(citing Qualitex Co., v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162–63 (1995)); 
Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10. 
50 Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11 (quoting Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., 
Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)). 
51 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. e (1995). 
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said that the word had come to have a secondary meaning  
. . . .52 
This exception for descriptive marks that have acquired secondary 
meaning suggests that public perception plays a significant role in 
determining whether a mark legitimately functions as a 
trademark.53 
In some cases, however, even if the public is aware that there is 
only one source for a product, the de facto secondary meaning 
doctrine dictates that the term used in the mark must remain free 
for competitive use if the term is in fact the commonly recognized 
name of the goods.54  The public, Internet users especially, are 
probably aware that each domain name is the only one in existence 
over the entire Internet and in the entire world.  Whether the de 
facto secondary meaning doctrine potentially could invalidate the 
protection of virtually all descriptive domain names remains a 
possibility. 
Generic marks, on the far end of the spectrum, are almost never 
protected even upon a showing of secondary meaning.55  Generic 
 
52 G.&C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912).  This court 
concluded that the plaintiff publisher’s title, Webster’s Dictionary and variations thereof, 
had acquired secondary meaning and could not be used by the defendant unless 
accompanied by a disclaimer. See id. at 378–79. 
53 See, e.g., Dart Drug Corp. v. Schering Corp., 320 F.2d 745, 748 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 
1963) (asserting that “confusion to the public is the essence of both trademark 
infringement and unfair competition” (citation omitted)). 
54 See Am. Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 822 (4th Cir. 2001) (asserting 
that “the repeated use of ordinary words functioning within the heartland of their ordinary 
meaning, and not distinctively, cannot give AOL a proprietary right over those words, 
even if an association develops between the words and AOL”); A.J. Canfield Co. v. 
Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 304 (3d Cir. 1986) (opining that “some terms so directly 
signify the nature of the product that interests of competition demand that other producers 
be able to use them even if the terms have or might become identified with a source and 
so acquire ‘de facto’ secondary meaning”). 
55 See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9 (stating that “even proof of secondary meaning . . . 
cannot transform a generic term into a subject for trademark”); see also Miller Brewing 
Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1977) (concluding that 
generic terms may not become a trademark under any circumstances); In re Med. 
Disposables Co., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1805 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. 1992) 
(holding that because the board “found the term MEDICAL DISPOSABLES to be 
generic, the question of whether or not it [had] acquired secondary meaning [was] 
irrelevant”). 
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marks are “common names that the relevant purchasing public 
understands primarily as describing the genus of goods or services 
being sold” and “by definition [are] incapable of indicating a 
particular source of the goods or services.”56  Known as the 
genericness doctrine, courts are principally concerned with the 
monopolization over the generic terms that are necessary for 
subsequent competitors to do business, which results from the 
grant of trademark protection.57  The Lanham Act authorizes courts 
to grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity,58 
and enjoining the use of generic terms is aimed to preserve 
competition within an industry.59  This genericness doctrine 
represents a significant public policy choice in trademark law and 
lays down a barrier against the protection of generic marks.60  As 
Professor J. Thomas McCarthy explained, “To grant an exclusive 
right to one [company] of use of the generic name of a product 
would be equivalent to creating a monopoly in that particular 
product, something that the trademark laws were never intended to 
accomplish.”61 
Section 2(f), however, suggests that marks may earn a place on 
the USPTO’s principal register if they have become distinctive, or 
have acquired secondary meaning.62  Generic marks never fall 
within the Section 2(f) exception, though, because courts have 
 
56 In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see In 
re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(emphasizing that generic marks are “incapable of indicating source” and are “the 
antithesis of trademarks” (citing Dan Robbins & Assocs., Inc. v. Questor Corp., 599 F.2d 
1009, 1014 (C.C.P.A. 1979))). 
57 See Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116–17 (1938) (declaring that 
when competitors have the right to make a product, they also have the right to use the 
term by which the public knows it); see also Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9 (stating that 
protection of generic marks with secondary meaning would “deprive competing 
manufacturers of the product of the right to call an article by its name”); supra note 23. 
58 See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2000) (“The several courts vested with jurisdiction of civil 
actions arising under this chapter shall have the power to grant injunctions, according to 
the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable . . . .”). 
59 See supra note 57. 
60 See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 12:2, at 12-7 to 12-9. 
61 Id. at 12-7 (footnote omitted). 
62 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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reasoned that generic marks are fundamentally incapable of 
becoming distinctive.63 
B. Administrative Treatment of GDNs 
While the law relating to the protectability of GDNs is not 
developed in the courts, according to the trademark examining 
attorneys at the USPTO and the appellate agency that reviews their 
decisions, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”), it is 
readily apparent that GDNs are not eligible for registration on 
either the principal or supplemental register.64  The underlying 
reason for this is that the USPTO’s guidelines for examining 
attorneys, as set forth in the Trademark Manual of Examining 
Procedure (“TMEP”), are averse to treating domain names as a 
unique form of trademark.65 
The main impediment to trademark registration is the USPTO’s 
policy with respect to top-level domains (“TLDs”).66  A domain 
name is composed of two main components: a second-level 
domain (“SLD”) and a TLD.67  Using the domain name 
<coffee.com> as an example, the term “coffee” is the SLD, 
followed by the TLD “.com.”  According to the TMEP, TLDs are 
not accorded any trademark significance,68 and the TTAB and 
reviewing courts agree.69  The TMEP states that TLDs “function to 
indicate an address on the World Wide Web, and therefore 
 
63 See cases cited supra note 56. 
64 See generally U.S. Pat. & Trademark Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/ttab (last modified Mar. 10, 2004) (describing 
the policies of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) and the types of 
proceedings over which it presides). 
65 See TMEP, supra note 43, § 1209.03(m). 
66 See id. 
67 See, e.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 
1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999); see also supra note 14. 
68 See TMEP, supra note 43, § 1209.03(m) (“Because TLDs generally serve no source-
indicating function, their addition to an otherwise unregistrable mark typically cannot 
render it registrable.”). 
69 See, e.g., Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1055 (finding that “‘MovieBuff’ and 
‘moviebuff.com’ are, for all intents and purposes, identical in terms of sight, sound, and 
meaning” and citing four other cases that found marks to be essentially identical when the 
TLD “.com” was the only difference); In re Martin Container, Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1058, 1060–61 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. June 11, 2002). 
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generally serve no source-indicating function.”70  Thus, “if a mark 
is composed of a generic term(s) for applicant’s goods or services 
and a TLD, the examining attorney must refuse registration on the 
ground that the mark is generic.”71  The TMEP cites <bank.com> 
for an online banking service and <turkey.com> for an online 
frozen turkey retailer as examples of unregistrable marks.72 
In In re Martin Container, the TTAB affirmed the decision of a 
trademark examining attorney in refusing to register 
<container.com> on the supplemental register on the grounds that 
the component terms were incapable of distinguishing the 
applicant’s services.73  The TTAB, relying on the test set forth in 
In re Gould Paper Corp.,74 found that the generic term “container” 
combined with “.com” to form <container.com> did not create an 
amalgamation that “somehow acquired the capability of 
identifying and distinguishing applicant’s services.”75  Specifically, 
the Gould test provides that the examining attorney may establish 
genericness by showing that “separate words joined to form a 
compound have a meaning identical to the meaning common usage 
would ascribe to those words as a compound.”76  The TTAB in 
Martin Container analogized the function of TLDs to that of other 
generic indicators placed after company names such as “Inc.,” 
“Co.,” and “LTD,” which merely identify the type of company or 
corporation.77  Accordingly, the TLD “.com” only identified the 
company as being an online entity.78  Consistent with the analyses 
in prior decisions that refused the registrations of the marks “Paint 
Products Co.” and “Office Movers, Inc.,” the TTAB concluded 
 
70 TMEP, supra note 43, § 1209.03(m). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. § 1215.05. 
73 See Martin Container, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060 (affirming the refusal of 
registration under section 23 of the Lanham Act); see also TMEP, supra note 43,  
§ 1215.05. 
74 834 F.2d 1017, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that the mark “Screenwipe” for pre-
moistened antistatic cloths used to clean computer and television screens was generic). 
75 Martin Container, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061. 
76 Gould, 834 F.2d at 1018. 
77 Martin Container, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1060. 
78 Id. 
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that <container.com> was “no more registrable than the generic 
terms would be by themselves.”79 
The TTAB in In re CyberFinancial.Net, Inc. likewise affirmed 
a trademark examining attorney’s rejection of <bonds.com> on the 
principal register.80  The TTAB, in this proceeding, made its 
determination based on the standard two-part test for genericness 
offered by the Federal Circuit for traditional marks: (1) what is the 
category of goods or services at issue; and (2) whether the term 
sought to be registered is understood by the relevant public 
primarily to refer to such category.81  The TTAB found that the 
category at issue was the “electronic commerce services regarding 
financial products . . . via the Internet” and that the public 
somehow understood <bonds.com> to refer to that category.82  
Drawing from the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Brookfield 
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment,83 the TTAB 
concluded that “.com” only signified the Web site’s commercial 
nature and carried no trademark significance.84  It found that the 
compound term—formed by combining “bonds” with “.com”—
was generic and stated that “the public would not understand 
BONDS.COM to have any meaning apart from the meaning of the 
individual terms combined.”85 
 
79 Id. (citing In re Paint Products Co., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1863 (Trademark Trial & 
App. Bd. July 8, 1988), and In re E.I. Kane, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1203 (Trademark 
Trial & App. Bd. Feb. 16, 1984), as examples of cases where generic company names 
combined with generic indicators were not adequately distinctive). 
80 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1789 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. Aug. 28, 2002). 
81 See H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 991 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986) (holding that the mark “Fire Chief” for a magazine on the topic of firefighting 
was descriptive and, therefore, valid after applying a two-part test to determine 
genericism); see also Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) 
(establishing the primary significance test for genericism, in which a plaintiff must show 
that the “primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the 
product, but the producer”). 
82 CyberFinancial.Net, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1790. 
83 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). 
84 CyberFinancial.Net, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1792 (stating that “‘second-level domain 
names communicate information as to source’” (quoting Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1055)). 
85 Id. at 1792. 
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The TTAB also addressed its interest in preserving 
competition.86  Applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning from an 
1888 case,87 the TTAB stated that it was necessary for 
<bonds.com> to remain available for other competitors in the same 
industry, such as <acmebonds.com> or <unitedbonds.com>, so 
that they could identify and distinguish their own goods and 
services.88 
II. UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW AND GENERIC TERMS 
The flexible doctrine of unfair competition “encompass[es] a 
broader range of unfair practices [than does trademark law,] which 
may be generally described as misappropriation of the skill, 
expenditures, and labor of another.”89  Marks that have not been 
registered on the USPTO’s principal or supplemental register 
nevertheless may gain protection under section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act (“Section 43(a)”)90 in cases where “the term name is 
so associated with [the owner’s] goods that use of the same or 
similar term by another company constitutes a representation that 
its good from the same source.”91  Section 43(a)(1)(A) allows 
recovery for the use of “any word, term, symbol, or device” that is 
likely to cause confusion as to the origin or association of one’s 
goods or services with those of another.92 
The following sections turn to the favorable, albeit rare, 
treatment of generic marks within this area of the Lanham Act.  In 
 
86 Id. at 1793 (stating that “competitors should be allowed to freely use [generic] marks  
. . . to identify and distinguish their services”). 
87 Goodyear’s India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598, 
602 (1888) (“Names which are thus descriptive of a class of goods cannot be exclusively 
appropriated by any one.  The addition of the word ‘Company’ only indicates that parties 
have formed an association . . . .”). 
88 See CyberFinancial.Net, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1793. 
89 Am. Footwear Corp. v. Gen. Footwear Co., 609 F.2d 655, 662 (2d Cir. 1979). 
90 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
91 Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 149–50 (2d Cir. 1997). 
92 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (providing a cause of action against any person who “uses in 
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device . . . which . . . is likely to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or 
association . . . or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, 
or commercial activities by another person”). 
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particular, two Second Circuit decisions provide a remedial 
platform to owners of traditional generic marks.93  Holders of less 
traditional generic marks—vanity phone numbers—also sought 
relief successfully in the Second Circuit as well as the Federal 
Circuit.94  While holders of vanity phone numbers are not 
uniformly entitled to an unfair competition claim,95 vanity phone 
number cases may offer insight into the types of issues that arise 
with respect to other less traditional generic marks, namely GDNs. 
A. Hope in the Second Circuit for Generic Marks 
The Second Circuit has provided some accommodation to 
holders of generic marks by suggesting that a competitor’s 
deceptive use of a generic term may support a claim for unfair 
competition.96  In Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Systems, 
the Second Circuit held that the “Murphy bed” mark was generic 
and not entitled to trademark protection, but subsequently 
concluded that its ruling did not preclude the Murphy Door Bed 
Company from bringing an unfair competition claim based on 
“passing off products.”97  The court opined that the defendant did 
not violate the principles of unfair competition merely by selling 
and advertising its products as Murphy beds; rather, the violation 
arose when it intentionally misrepresented its beds as being those 
manufactured by the company holding the “Murphy beds” mark.98 
Similarly, the Second Circuit in Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh 
Brewing Co. suggested that the use of plaintiff beer company’s 
generic mark, “Honey Brown”—if closely associated with 
 
93 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
94 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
95 See infra notes 128–31 and accompanying text. 
96 See Forschner Group v. Arrow Trading Co., 30 F.3d 348, 358 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(holding that “[i]f there is a sufficient factual predicate for this allegation [of confusion as 
to source], injunctive relief is warranted irrespective of whether the phrase Swiss Army 
knife is generic”); Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 
1989); accord Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded Ams. Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 
1043 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (concluding that “if an organization’s own name is generic, a 
competitor’s subsequent use of that name may give rise to an unfair competition claim if 
competitor’s failure adequately to identify itself as distinct from the first organization 
causes confusion or a likelihood of confusion”). 
97 Murphy Door Bed Co., 874 F.2d at 102. 
98 Id. 
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plaintiff’s beverage—would be impermissible when such use 
would engender a likelihood of confusion as to the source.99  The 
Genesee court articulated the two elements of an unfair 
competition claim: “(1) an association of origin by the consumer 
between the mark and the first user, and (2) a likelihood of 
consumer confusion when the mark is applied to the second user’s 
good.”100  Association of origin is synonymous with secondary 
meaning and arises when consumers primarily associate a mark 
with the producer of the goods or services, and not merely the 
goods or services themselves.101  Therefore, a claim for unfair 
competition based upon the use of a generic mark ultimately 
requires that the claimant demonstrate “(1) something valuable to 
lose (consumer good will), and (2) a likelihood that it will be 
unfairly taken (consumer confusion),” at least in the Second 
Circuit.102  Although the Genesee court acknowledged that 
consumers and bartenders alike referred to the plaintiff’s beer 
simply as “Honey Brown” and that the defendant company did not 
take steps to eliminate public confusion in using the term, the court 
held that preliminary injunction was an inappropriate remedy for 
an unfair competition claim.103 
B. The Vanity Phone Number Paradigm 
With few judicial decisions surrounding GDNs,104 the law 
involving vanity phone numbers that contain generic terms may 
 
99 Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 150 (2d Cir. 1997). 
100 Id. (citing Forschner, 904 F. Supp. at 1417). 
101 Forschner, 904 F. Supp. at 1417; see also 2-7 GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 31,  
§ 7.02[5][a], at 7-23 (“[The] implied requirement of Section 43(a) was variously called a 
form of unique association, a ‘quality similar to secondary meaning,’ or ‘secondary 
meaning.’” (footnotes omitted)). 
102 Forschner, 904 F. Supp. at 1418. 
103 Genesee, 124 F.3d at 151. 
104 In one rare decision, E-cards v. King, No. 99-CV-3726 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2000), a 
jury awarded an online greeting card company, who held the GDN <e-cards.com>, $4 
million on its unfair competition claim against a competitor, who operated under the 
name <ecards.com>. See Peter Brown, Protection of Trademarks and Trade Secrets in E-
Commerce, in SOLVING THE LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING B2B TRANSACTIONS, at 127, 142 
(PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. 650, 
2001).  The verdict in the E-cards decision is viewed by scholars and some practitioners 
as effectively granting the online card company a monopoly over a generic term. Id. 
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provide guidance because GDNs and vanity phone numbers have 
several characteristics in common.105  Like GDNs, phone numbers 
are unique because there can be only one holder of any given 
phone number.106  Vanity phone numbers, such as 1-800-
LAWYERS and 1-800-FLOWERS, are dualistic; they serve as 
both an identifier of a business and a locator by connecting would-
be dialers.107  The USPTO’s policy with respect to dialing prefixes, 
such as 800, 888, and 877, is the same with TLDs, in that dialing 
prefixes are not accorded any trademark significance.108  
Moreover, a generic term combined with a dialing prefix is not 
eligible for registration on the principal or supplemental register.109 
Domain names are also subject to a similar “parasitic” problem 
that plagues vanity phone numbers.110  This parasitic problem 
arises when competitors anticipate and take advantage of the 
public’s misdialing, mistyping, or misspelling to create vanity 
phone numbers or domain names that are confusingly similar to 
existing ones.111 
 
105 See, e.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 
1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (observing that “[e]ach web page has a corresponding domain 
address, which is an identifier somewhat analogous to a telephone number or street 
address”); cf. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 7:17.1, at 7-26 (listing other legal 
metaphors to domain names such as radio station call letters).  Compare Ann K. 
Linnehan, Need Trademark Protection for a Generic Domain Name?  Help May Be Just 
a Phone Call Away, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 503, 528–34 (2002/2003) (comparing the structure 
of domain names to vanity phone numbers and urging that similar protection is justified), 
with Christie L. Branson, Comment, Was $7.5 Million a Good Deal for Business.com?  
The Difficulties of Obtaining Trademark Protection and Registration for Generic and 
Descriptive Domain Names, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 285, 310 
(2001) (arguing that the analogy of vanity phone numbers to domain names would result 
in monopolistic practices whereby competitors would be prohibited from using generic 
terms to describe their products). 
106 See InterNIC.net, A Non-Technical Explanation, supra note 16 (“Think of the phone 
system . . . when you dial a number, it rings at a particular location because there is a 
central numbering plan that ensures that each telephone number is unique.  The [domain 
name system] works in a similar way.”). 
107 See Branson, supra note 105, at 307. 
108 TMEP, supra note 43, § 1209.01(b)(12). 
109 Id. 
110 See Nathenson, supra note 19, at 927, 968 (comparing parasitic domain names to 
commonly-misdialed numbers that correspond to well-known vanity phone numbers). 
111 See, e.g., id. 
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A notable dissimilarity between domain names and vanity 
phone numbers, however, is that phone numbers can contain only 
ten digits whereas GDNs can contain up to sixty-three 
characters.112  Thus, the range of available alternatives and word 
arrangements is more limited with phone numbers than with 
domain names.113 
Four key cases illustrate the differing approaches to trademark 
and unfair competition claims involving vanity phone numbers.  In 
Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page,114 a mattress retailer, 
primarily doing business in the New York metropolitan area under 
the phone number MATTRES (628-8737), sued a competitor for 
adopting the confusingly similar phone number 1-800-
MATTRESS (628-8737).115  The Second Circuit declined to 
decide the case solely upon traditional principles applicable to 
generic terms and instead asserted that the mattress retailer “[did] 
not lose the right to protection against [the competitor’s] use of a 
confusingly similar number and a confusingly similar set of letters 
that correlate with that number . . . just because the letters spell a 
generic term.”116  The court opined that a competitor should not 
remain free to confuse the public by using a deceptively similar 
phone number.117  The Second Circuit further asserted that phone 
 
112 See In re CyberFinancial.Net, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1789, 1793 (Trademark Trial & App. 
Bd. Aug. 28, 2002).  Although sixty-three characters is feasible, the average number of 
characters in a domain name is only eleven. See Zooknic Internet Intelligence, Average 
Length of Domain Names, at http://www.zooknic.com/Domains/dn_length.html (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2004). 
113 See infra text accompanying notes 132–31.  For a detailed discussion comparing 
vanity phone numbers and domain names, see Nathenson, supra note 19, at 966–69.  Ira 
S. Nathenson observes that with telephone numbers, 
the letters “Q” and “Z” are unavailable.  Further, since the numbers two (2) 
through nine (9) on a phone each correspond to three letters, one mnemonic 
word may preclude other words: 1-800-BEER-R-US is the same number as 1-
800-BEEP-R-UP, and 1-800-4-DOLE-96 is the same as 1-800-I-FOLD-96. . . . 
Domain names, however, . . . may comprise almost any alphanumeric 
character. 
Id. 
114  880 F.2d 675, 676 (2d Cir. 1989).   
115 The Second Circuit noted that the mattress retailer was “not seeking protection 
against a competitor’s use of the word ‘mattress’ solely to identify the competitor’s name 
or product.” Id. at 678. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
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numbers may be entitled to trademark protection and that 
confusingly similar numbers may be enjoined.118 
The same mattress retailer appealed the TTAB’s refusal to 
register 1-888-MATRESS (628-7377) as a service mark in In re 
Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp.119  The Federal Circuit held that 
the vanity phone number was registrable on the principal register 
on the grounds that it was descriptive and had acquired 
distinctiveness.120  It did not analyze the dialing prefix “888” and 
the term “mattress” as a combination of two generic terms, as 
traditionally had been done under the Gould test.121  Instead, it 
limited Gould as being “applicable only to ‘compound words 
formed by the union of words’ where the public understands the 
individual terms to be generic for a genus of goods or services, and 
the joining of the individual terms into one compound word lends 
‘no additional meaning to the term.’”122  The court concluded that 
the Gould test was the wrong test to apply in this context.123  The 
Federal Circuit likened 1-888-MATRESS to a “phrase” rather than 
a compound word and adopted the commercial-impression-as-a-
whole test, in which a vanity phone number is considered as a 
whole and not as separate components.124  Viewing 1-888-
MATRESS as a whole, the Federal Circuit concluded that the mark 
was not generic because the relevant public did not refer to “the 
class of shop-at-home telephone mattress retailers” as 1-888-
MATRESS.125  Given the ten-digit make-up of phone numbers, the 
Federal Circuit observed that holding a phone number containing 
the term “mattress” already has precluded competitors from using 
that number “for all practical purposes,” and that further 
 
118 Id. 
119 240 F.3d 1341, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
120 Id. at 1347–48 (finding that 1-888-MATRESS was the “legal equivalent” of the prior 
registered mark 212-MATTRES and, therefore, entitled to prima face evidence of 
acquired distinctiveness). 
121 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
122 Dial-A-Mattress, 240 F.3d at 1345 (emphasis added) (citing In re Am. Fertility 
Soc’y, 188 F.3d 1341, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). 
123 Id.  
124 Id. at 1345–46. 
125 Id. at 1346. 
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precluding registration “merely shifts the race from the [USPTO] 
to the telephone company.”126 
In stark contrast to the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit in 
Dranoff-Perlstein Associates v. Sklar127 refused to grant any 
protection to a vanity phone number containing a generic term.128  
A personal injury firm with INJURY-1 (465-8791) as its phone 
number sued a competitor for doing business with INJURY-9 
(465-8799).129  The Third Circuit adhered to traditional trademark 
principles, which grant protection only to marks that are arbitrary, 
suggestive, or descriptive with a showing of secondary meaning.130  
It reasoned that protection for vanity phone numbers containing 
generic terms would allow the first company to obtain such a 
phone number to gain an unfair advantage over its competitors 
“merely by winning the race to the telephone company.”131  The 
Third Circuit observed that the ten-digit make-up of phone 
numbers severely limited “the range of commonly used 
alternatives which effectively communicate the same functional 
information as the word ‘injury.’”132  It concluded that if the 
personal injury firm were permitted to preclude competitors from 
using “injury” in their phone numbers, “it would achieve the kind 
of unfair competitive advantage the genericness doctrine is 
supposed to prevent.”133 
Rather than addressing the issue of mark classification or the 
implications of the genericness doctrine, the Sixth Circuit in 
Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc.134 focused on the public 
confusion that potentially arises from the use of parasitic phone 
numbers.135  The hotel chain Holiday Inns, which used 1-800-
 
126 Id. 
127  967 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1992). 
128 Id. at 857. 
129 Id. at 853–54. 
130 Id. at 855 (discussing the categories of marks under the Lanham Act and their 
respective levels of protection). 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 859. 
133 Id. at 859–60.  Ultimately, the Third Circuit remanded for a determination as to 
whether there was a likelihood of confusion with respect to the mark as a whole. Id. at 
863. 
134  Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996). 
135 See id. 
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HOLIDAY (1-800-465-4329) to book reservations, sued an 
independent booking service for employing 1-800-H0LIDAY (1-
800-465-0329).136  Dialers reaching the latter number immediately 
received a recorded message notifying dialers of their misdial and 
disclaiming affiliation to Holiday Inns.137  The Sixth Circuit 
distinguished Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page by 
pointing out that the competitor in that case had promoted its 
vanity phone number so as to deliberately cause public 
confusion.138  The Sixth Circuit opined that the independent 
booking service merely took advantage of a “preexisting 
confusion” on the part of the dialers—namely, the confusion 
between the number zero and the letter O on the dial pad—but did 
not itself “create” that confusion.139  The Sixth Circuit held that the 
booking service did not use the Holiday Inns trademark nor engage 
in misleading representation.140  The booking service, therefore, 
did not violate the “plain language” of the Lanham Act.141 
III.   THE APPLICATION OF TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
PRINCIPLES TO GDNS 
Mechanically labeling GDNs as generic marks, as trademark 
examining attorneys and the TTAB do, necessarily evokes the 
genericness doctrine.142  Contrary to traditional marks, however, 
 
136 Id. at 621. 
137 Id.  The recorded message stated: “Hello.  You have misdialed and have not reached 
Holiday Inns or any of its affiliates.  You’ve called 800 Reservations, America’s fastest 
growing independent computerized hotel reservation service.” Id. 
138 Id. at 624. 
139 See id. at 625 (observing that the defendant in Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. had 
promoted “1-800-MATTRESS” as its phone number in the same geographic regions as 
the plaintiff was promoting its number, thereby causing confusion). 
140 Id. at 626. 
141 Id.  The district court noted that the booking service was in clear violation of the 
“spirit,” but not the “letter,” of the Lanham Act. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, 
Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1247, 1255 (E.D. Tenn. 1993), rev’d in part, 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 
1996). 
142 See, e.g., In re Allwall Techs., Inc., No. 75/879,693, 2003 TTAB LEXIS 395 
(Trademark Trial & App. Bd. Aug. 19, 2003) (refusing registration of <art.com> as 
generic); In re Mark Deitch & Assocs., Inc., No. 75/857,971, 2003 TTAB LEXIS 219 
(Trademark Trial & App. Bd. May 13, 2003) (refusing registration of 
<websitedesigns.com> as generic); In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, No. 78/061,755, 2003 
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domain names are one of a kind.  For example, only one 
<coffee.com> can exist in cyberspace whereas an infinite number 
of companies named Coffee Co. can co-exist in the offline 
world.143  Hence, the main concern that the genericness doctrine 
was meant to address—the free use of common words—is not 
encountered with GDNs.144  In other words, permitting multiple e-
companies to freely compete with <coffee.com> is impossible.145 
The touchstone of trademark and unfair competition claims—
ensuring consumers’ rights not to be confused146—is rendered 
nearly inoperative in the GDN context.  Due to the unique nature 
of GDNs, there is no need to shelter consumers from confusion 
arising from multiple competitors using the GDN <coffee.com>.  
Legitimate concerns over restrained competition or likelihood of 
confusion may arise when e-businesses adopt parasitic domain 
names such as <coffeee.com>, <coffee.net>, or <coffee-
online.com>.  Moreover, offline companies taking on deceptively 
similar names to GDNs, or even identical names, may present 
trademark infringement and unfair competition issues as well. 
The following sections evaluate how traditional principles and 
policies that have guided generic marks operate within the realm of 
GDNs when their unique nature are accorded a more prominent 
role in the analysis.  Respecting their uniqueness presents novel 
considerations in mark classification, while exposing the flaws in 
the anticompetition argument underlying the genericness 
doctrine.147 
 
TTAB LEXIS 194 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. Apr. 16, 2003) (refusing registration of 
<patents.com> as merely descriptive). 
143 See supra note 16. 
144 Regarding concurrent use on the Internet, Professor Michael B. Landau observed: 
“On the Internet, the domain name form ‘trademark.com’ does not give any indication of 
territory or of goods and/or services.  Traditional concurrent use of a trademark by itself, 
without alphanumeric modifiers specifying geographic market or goods and services in 
the domain name, is unworkable.” Michael B. Landau, Problems Arising Out of the Use 
of “www.Trademark.com”: The Application of Principles of Trademark Law to Internet 
Domain Name Disputes, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 455, 472 (1997). 
145 See supra note 16. 
146 See supra note 53. 
147 See infra Part III.A; see also text accompanying supra notes 57–61. 
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A. Breaking Down and Sizing Up GDNs 
Placing GDNs within the spectrum of distinctiveness, which 
can be determinative of whether a protectable mark exists in the 
first place,148 is not a simple task.  One method used to classify 
these marks is what the TMEP instructs in section 1209.03(m) for 
the purposes of registration, and another possibility is derived from 
the Federal Circuit’s approach to vanity phone numbers.149  The 
diverging approaches of the USPTO, as conveyed through the 
TMEP, and the Federal Circuit are revealing of the crucial role that 
TLDs play in determining how GDNs should be appropriately 
analyzed.150 
1. Approaches to How GDNs Can Be Analyzed 
Dissecting GDNs into their component parts and viewing them 
only as a combination of generic terms almost always will render 
GDNs generic marks and ultimately unregistrable.151  The TMEP 
appears to handle GDNs as if they are compound words, by 
subjecting them to Gould-like treatment152 and automatically 
disregarding the TLDs.153  A TLD, by itself, does not have a 
source-identifying function154 and rightly should not be given 
trademark significance.  But the TMEP’s instructions under section 
1209.03(m) are problematic because they further assume that the 
union of a TLD with a SLD produces no additional source 
identification.155  Average Internet consumers arguably do not 
break down a domain name into its TLD and SLD components, nor 
do they attribute trademark significance solely to the SLD.156  
<Coffee.com> would be recited in full as “coffee dot com,” and 
 
148 See supra Part I.A. 
149 See In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(finding that “1-888-MATTRESS” was registrable as a service mark because it had 
acquired distinctiveness); supra Part I.B. 
150 See infra Part III.A.1. 
151 But see text accompanying supra note 65. 
152 See text accompanying supra notes 74–79. 
153 See TMEP, supra note 43, § 1209.03(m). 
154 See supra Part I.B. 
155 See TMEP, supra note 43, § 1209.03(m); supra Part I.B. 
156 But see Branson, supra note 105, at 303 (suggesting that the public accords “little 
significance” to the “www” and “.com” components). 
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only then would it give off the impression of a coffee retailer who 
does business on the Internet.  The SLD alone, “coffee,” signifies 
little without attaching a TLD. 
In effect, the TMEP’s approach in section 1209.03(m) 
forecloses any chance of registration to companies that operate 
exclusively on the Internet, regardless of the possibility of 
deceptive trade practices by competitors.157  The TTAB, in Martin 
Container, chose to compare the function of TLDs to that of 
generic indicators such as “Inc.” and “Ltd.,” and in doing so, made 
a significant oversight: while it is true that “Inc.” identifies 
extremely little about a company’s source, “.com” speaks to the 
only possible source.158  The most that “Inc.” or “Ltd.” adds to a 
term is the type of business entity, many of which can co-exist 
with the same name and generic indicator.159  The TLD “.com” can 
indicate the type of entity160 as well as the only entity when 
attached to a SLD.161  Analyzing domain names as mere generic 
components under the Gould test, therefore, underestimates the 
“brand new” meaning formed by the union of a SLD and a TLD. 
The Federal Circuit’s approach to vanity phone numbers 
(commercial-impression-as-a-whole test)162 arguably makes more 
sense as applied to domain names because it captures how the 
 
157 But see text accompanying note 65. 
158 See supra note 16. 
159 See Sarah E. Akhtar & Robert C. Cumbow, Why Domain Names Are Not Generic: 
An Analysis of Why Domain Names Incorporating Generic Terms Are Entitled to 
Trademark Protection, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. 226, 234 (1999) (pointing out that several 
companies can co-exist with the same name, even within the same industry). 
160 See In re CyberFinancial.Net, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1789, 1792 (Trademark Trial & App. 
Bd. Aug. 28, 2002) (finding that “.com” only indicated a Web site’s commercial nature); 
In re Martin Container, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1058, 1060 (Trademark Trial & App. Bd. June 11, 
2002) (defining “.com” as “the code used to identify an Internet user as one operating (or 
belonging to) a commercial organization (business)”) (citations omitted).  Other TLDs 
can identify types of entities as well.  For example, the “.biz” registry is reserved for the 
promotion of small and large businesses. Neulevel, at http://www.neulevel.biz (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2004).  Networking providers employ the “.net” registries, and non-profit 
organizations commonly apply to “.org” registries. See Brookfield Communications, Inc. 
v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999).  The “.pro” registry was 
established for self-certified professionals, such as doctors, accountants, and lawyers. 
RegistryPro, at http://www.registrypro.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2004). 
161 See supra note 16. 
162 See text accompanying supra note 124. 
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public realistically views domain names.  <Coffee.com> is akin to 
a phrase, or a sequence of words that are regarded as a meaningful 
unit.163  Attaching “.com” to the end of “coffee” lends additional 
meaning on the whole by indicating that the company’s services 
are online, are represented by a commercial entity bearing some 
relation to coffee, and, most importantly, originate from the only e-
company in existence with the domain name <coffee.com>. 
2. GDNs as Generic Marks Overall? 
A GDN, when properly analyzed as a phrase, does not fit the 
traditional conception of a generic mark.  Put another way, GDNs 
do not pass as generic marks under the standard two-part test to 
determine genericism.164  First, <coffee.com> is not the common 
name that the relevant public understands to refer to coffee 
retailers who do business on the Internet.165  <Coffee.com> is not 
literally the genus of online coffee retailers.166  Second, as 
discussed above, <coffee.com> is capable of indicating the source 
of the services because the public recognizes that <coffee.com> is 
the only source there is. 
A complementary definition of a generic mark, which is tied to 
free competition principles, depends on the competitors’ need to 
use it: “if no commonly used alternative effectively communicates 
the same functional information, the term that denotes the product 
[or service] is generic.”167  While competitors engaged in the 
online coffee business may need the word “coffee” to adequately 
 
163 E.g., WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 829 (1995); cf. Linnehan, supra note 
105, at 528–29 (“[A] top-level domain such as ‘.com’ is not a word and is not generic for 
the services of the domain name.  It is a code of reference used to signify the type of 
organization identified by the domain name.  Each of these codes—‘888’ and ‘.com’—
when combined with a word element like ‘mattress’ or ‘container,’ create a brief 
expression.  In other words, a phrase is created.”). 
164 See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the two-part test offered by the 
Federal Circuit to determine whether a mark is generic). 
165 But see Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce, supra note 15, at 956–66 
(implying that the public immediately understands <www.wireless.com> to refer to 
wireless services). 
166 See text accompanying supra note 56. 
167 A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 305–06 (3d Cir. 1986); see also 
Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting 
that the test articulated in A.J. Canfield is a useful complement to the test for genericism). 
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describe their services, <coffee.com>, as such, is not a term that 
competitors can use to compete because of the technical limitations 
of the Internet.  Thus, the need of several competitors to use 
<coffee.com> concurrently would be impossible to satisfy.168 
Even if GDNs escape from being labeled as generic marks, the 
de facto secondary meaning doctrine169 might operate to prevent 
any rights from being acquired in the GDNs.  At first glance, the 
de facto secondary meaning doctrine appears to apply to GDNs 
because it refers to the situation in which the public is aware that a 
single source for a particular service exists over a period of time.170  
This doctrine, like the genericness doctrine, “reflects the legal 
conclusion that . . . the term must be held free for competitive use 
if it is in fact the commonly recognized name of the goods.”171  
Because the rationale of the de facto secondary meaning doctrine 
also anticipates the need for free competitive use, it also fails to 
concede the non-duplicable nature of domain names. 
GDNs fit tenuously within the definition of a generic mark.  
The result of approaching GDNs as phrases, under the commercial-
impression-as-a-whole test, is that GDNs seldom would be 
considered generic marks.  Although <coffee.com> is a service 
mark that contains a generic term, it is not necessarily a generic 
mark overall. 
3. GDNs as Descriptive Marks 
The category of descriptive marks is a better classification for 
GDNs.172  For example, <pets.com> conveys the impression that 
some service related to pets is available by visiting the Web site—
whether it be the online service of a pet seller, a pet supply retailer, 
a pet care service, or a newsletter on the topic of pet care.  The 
Federal Circuit in Dial-A-Mattress stated that “the mark need not 
recite each feature of the relevant goods or services in detail to be 
 
168 See supra note 16. 
169 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
170 See supra text accompanying note 54. 
171 JANE C. GINSBURG, JESSICA LITMAN & MARY L. KEVLIN, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 336 (3d ed. 2001). 
172 The Second Circuit acknowledged that “[t]he lines of demarcation . . . are not always 
bright.” Abercrombie & Fitch v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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descriptive.”173  <Pets.com> would be sufficiently descriptive, 
although not exact as to which type of pet-related services is being 
offered. 
Here, TLDs again introduce a novel consideration in the 
classification of marks.  TLDs are an indispensable component to 
every domain name because a Web site cannot operate without 
one.174  While TLDs lend meaning to GDNs on the whole, they 
primarily serve a functional role.175  Yet, the very component that 
transforms the GDNs into descriptive marks—the TLD—is 
mandatory for all GDNs.176  Every company doing business 
through a Web site must employ a TLD in its domain name, and 
the types of TLDs available to select from are limited.177  The 
necessity of TLDs, therefore, automatically forces descriptive 
names upon e-companies.  Nevertheless, <pets.com> more closely 
resembles a descriptive mark rather than a generic mark overall.  
That TLDs are required components of all domain names does not 
mean that a domain name is less capable of functioning as a valid 
trademark. 
4. Arbitrary or Suggestive GDNs 
The main focus of this Note is on e-companies that adopt 
GDNs and provide online services having to do with the generic 
terms involved—such as an online espresso machine retailer that 
employs <coffee.com>—and whether those GDNs are truly 
generic marks.  An e-company might adopt a GDN for services 
unrelated to the generic term and, thus, may encounter less of a 
classification obstacle in the trademark examining attorney’s 
office.178  Section 12.09.03(d) of the TMEP states that a “mark 
 
173 In re Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp., 240 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(emphasis added). 
174 See InterNIC.net, A Non-Technical Explanation, supra note 16. 
175 See id. 
176 See id. 
177 In addition to “.com,” “.net,” and “.edu,” newly offered TLDs include “.aero,” “.biz,” 
“.coop,” “.info,” “.museum,” and “.name.” InterNIC.net, InterNIC FAQs on New Top-
Level Domains, at http://www.internic.net/faqs/new-tlds.html (last updated Sept. 25, 
2002).  The registry agreement for “.pro” is under negotiation. Id. 
178 See TMEP, supra note 43, § 12.09.03(d); see, e.g., In re Colonial Stores, Inc., 394 
F.2d 549, 552 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (holding that the mark “SUGAR & SPICE” for bakery 
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comprising a combination of merely descriptive components is 
registrable if the combination of terms creates a unitary mark with 
a unique, nondescriptive meaning, or if the composite has a bizarre 
or incongruous meaning as applied to the goods.”179  Accordingly, 
<coffee.com> would be considered an arbitrary mark when it is 
used to sell assorted candies online whereas <sugar.com> would 
be a suggestive mark to sell the same.  Both of these GDNs 
arguably would be entitled to trademark registration and 
protection, regardless of whether they are viewed as a combination 
of generic terms or as a phrase, because they fall within the 
inherently distinctive end of the spectrum of distinctiveness.180  A 
GDN that is used in an arbitrary or suggestive manner may be 
easier to recognize and may pose less of problem for registration at 
the USPTO.181 
B. GDNs Behaving Anticompetitively 
As technology stands today, nothing can be done about the de 
facto monopoly conferred to the holder of any given domain 
name.182  <Coffee.com>, as such, is untouchable by online 
competitors that desire the same domain name.183  Valid 
anticompetitive concerns, however, may arise with respect to the 
use of similar domain names, especially because GDNs 
incorporate generic terms.  By obtaining a court-issued 
injunction,184 the company holding <coffee.com> potentially could 
enjoin competitors, such as <coffee.net> or <coffee-online.com>, 
from using the term “coffee” in their domain names. 
Analogizing GDNs to vanity phone numbers (as analyzed by 
the courts in the Dial-A-Mattress decisions) may exacerbate these 
 
products was entitled to trademark registration because the combined terms could 
“function as an indication of more than a mere description of the ingredients of the goods 
on which the mark is used”). 
179 TMEP, supra note 43, § 12.09.03(d); see also supra note 178. 
180 See text accompanying supra notes 45–46. 
181 See supra note 178. 
182 See supra Part III.A.2. 
183 See id. 
184 See 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2001) (establishing that courts with jurisdiction over civil 
actions concerning trademarks may grant injunctions to prevent the violation of a 
trademark holder’s rights). 
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anticompetitive concerns.  Although domain names resemble 
vanity phone numbers in several ways, one dissimilarity remains 
significant: many more variations of domain names are possible 
using the same generic term because the SLD of a domain name 
can contain up to sixty-three characters and can include alphabetic 
letters, numerals, and hyphens, whereas vanity phone numbers are 
limited to exactly ten digits.185  A GDN holder who successfully 
brings a cause of action in the Federal or Second Circuits, by way 
of analogy to vanity phone numbers, potentially could enjoin 
competitors from using all of those variations over the entire 
Internet.186  As a result, a system would be created whereby 
trademark priority would be established according to the first to 
scoop up a GDN by applying to a domain name registrar,187 which 
screens domain names against multiple registrations.188  The first 
to register a GDN with Network Solutions, Inc.,189 for example, 
would be the first and only one able to commercially put it to use 
and then get it onto the USPTO’s register.190 
 
185 See In re CyberFinancial.Net, Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q. 1789, 1793 (Trademark Trial & App. 
Bd. Aug. 28, 2002); text accompanying supra notes 112–13. 
186 See Nathenson, supra note 19, at 968 (arguing that more possibilities exist with 
similar domain names than in the case of telephone numbers). 
187 See Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce, supra note 15, at 976–78; 
Branson, supra note 105, at 310. 
188 Domain name registrars administer domains names to prevent multiple entities from 
registering the same domain name. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, 
Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 953 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (explaining the role of the registrar, National 
Science Foundation, in screening domain name applications); InterNIC.net, A Non-
Technical Explanation, supra note 16 (discussing the function of registrars).  As one 
registrar explains, “Registrars process name registrations for Internet end users and then 
send the necessary [domain name system] information to a registry for entry into the 
centralized registry database.  The [domain name system] information is then propagated 
over the Internet.” VeriSign, Naming and Directory Services, Frequently Asked 
Questions, at http://www.verisign.com/nds/naming/faq.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).  
To maintain a Web site, an applicant must first register the domain name with a domain 
name registrar. See InterNIC.net, InterNIC FAQs on the Domain Names, Registrars, and 
Registration, at http://www.internic.net/faqs/domain-names.html (last updated Sept. 25, 
2003). 
189 Network Solutions, Inc. is the largest domain name registrar. See Network Solutions, 
Inc., About Network Solutions, at http://www.networksolutions.com/en_US/about-
us.jhtml;jsessionid=FXEASTS15K1OGCWLEALCFEQ (last visited Apr. 2, 2004). 
190 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2001) (requiring “use in commerce”); supra note 29. 
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These anticompetition concerns would pose less difficulty if 
the USPTO and the courts chose to grant only qualified GDNs—
i.e., those marks that are successful and widely recognized by the 
public—protection.  Any advantage that may result from first-
come-first-serve registration with Network Solutions is innate to 
the domain name system; someone will always be the first to 
register a GDN with a domain name registrar and become its sole 
holder.191  This “priority system” would not necessarily grant a 
monopoly to the first entity to dream up <coffee.com> and register 
it with Network Solutions, as some argue.192  According to the 
proposal below, it simply would allow the company holding 
<coffee.com> the opportunity to earn and exercise the statutory 
rights owed to it in accordance to Section 43(a) the Lanham Act.193 
IV.  FAIR PLAY IN CYBERSPACE: A PROPOSAL FOR 
GDN PROTECTION 
A competitor should not remain free to use a domain name that 
is deceptively similar to a GDN that has achieved success and 
recognition in the e-marketplace.  Because “coffee” is generic, 
<coffee.com> should not be able to enjoin e-competitors in the 
same industry that merely use <coffeee.com>, <coffee.net>, or 
<coffee-now.com>, but it should be able to sustain a claim against 
competitors who deceptively use those domain names to pass off 
their services as those belonging to <coffee.com>.194  Therefore, a 
competitor does not engage in trademark infringement merely by 
 
191 See supra note 187. 
192 See, e.g., Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce, supra note 15, at 976–77 
(arguing that a company that merely registers a GDN first gains an unfair advantage over 
its competitors); supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
193 But see Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce, supra note 15, at 976–77 
(“Extending unfair competition law with respect to generic domain names will hinder the 
growth of e-commerce.”).  Specifically, Professor Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen opposes 
injunctive relief in this context. Id. at 978. 
194 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15, cmt. d (1995) (“Use of a 
generic term in a manner likely to deceive or mislead a significant number of prospective 
purchasers as to the source of the goods or service, however, may subject the user to 
liability under the general rule proscribing misrepresentations of source. . . . Subsequent 
users, although protected in their right to use a generic term, may thus be required to take 
reasonable precautions to avoid a likelihood of confusion.”). 
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selling and advertising its services under the domain name 
<coffeee.com>; it might, however, end up confusing the public in 
doing so.195 
The rules of genericism should not be rigidly applied to domain 
names because they do not fit the mold of traditional marks.  The 
best way to approach GDNs is to revisit the two fundamental goals 
of trademark and unfair competition law—protecting consumers’ 
ability to distinguish among services provided by competitors and 
guarding the goodwill of mark owners196—and assemble a system 
of protection that effectively serves those goals. 
GDNs can be protected in such a way that remains faithful to 
the spirit of the Lanham Act, without going beyond the letter of the 
law.  The law of unfair competition is sufficiently flexible to 
provide protection to GDNs.  Unlike Section 32(1), the broad 
language of Section 43(a) does not require that the mark be 
registered, which suggests that the insurmountable hurdle that 
generic marks face in trademark law is not present in unfair 
competition law.197  With no reference to the requirement of a 
“registered mark,” Section 43(a) appears to extend trademark-like 
protection to marks that are not registered or registrable.198  This 
may mean that the search for the perfect classification of GDNs 
has little bearing on the application of Section 43(a).  As one 
treatise explained, “Congress recognized that [Section 43(a)] fills 
an important gap in federal unfair competition law and . . . it 
expects the courts to continue to interpret the section 
accordingly.”199  The Second Circuit’s refusal in Dial-A-Mattress, 
therefore, to foreclose an unfair competition claim based on a 
 
195 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
196 See discussion supra Part I. 
197 E.g., Forschner Group, Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co., 904 F. Supp. 1409, 1416 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“Although genericness prevents a word or phrase from attaining 
trademark protection, it does not prevent a court from determining whether a 
competitor’s later use of that word or phrase is unfair.”). 
198 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2001) (establishing that any person who uses any word in a 
manner likely to cause confusion, or misrepresents goods or services shall be liable). 
199 2-7 GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 31, § 7.02[4], at 7-18. 
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service mark containing a generic term was not an anomaly in the 
law and was within the bounds of the Lanham Act.200 
The spirit of the Lanham Act calls for the government to 
safeguard businesses’ goodwill, and e-companies that adopt GDNs 
should not be excluded.201  Categorically excluding GDNs from 
protection would be accepting a tenuous classification of 
genericism and ignoring the uniqueness that GDNs possess apart 
from the familiar, yet outmoded, spectrum of distinctiveness.  The 
following sections propose a system of protection against unfair 
trade practices for e-companies that hold qualified GDNs.  The 
proposed cause of action is crafted within the boundaries of the 
Lanham Act and takes into consideration the backdrop of potential 
anticompetition concerns. 
A. Cause of Action for GDN Holders 
A claim for the protection of a GDN should satisfy two 
intertwined requirements: (1) the GDN has acquired substantial 
secondary meaning; and (2) there is a likelihood of confusion 
among the relevant public.  The unique nature of GDNs goes to the 
first requirement, but more than inherent uniqueness should be 
shown.  A showing of substantial secondary meaning additionally 
ensures that the most deserving GDNs are protected. 
 
200 But see Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce, supra note 15, at 976–77 
(stating that “expanding [section 43(a)] to include competitor’s use of generic terms fails 
to reconcile with other provisions in the Lanham Act that grant no trademark protection 
to generic trademarks”). 
201 In recognizing the importance of goodwill, the Supreme Court stated: 
The protection of trade-marks is the law’s recognition of the psychological 
function of symbols.  If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that 
we purchase goods by them.  A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which 
induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe 
he wants. 
Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). 
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1. Establishing Substantial Secondary Meaning 
While the majority of the public probably is aware that only 
one given domain name can exist on the Internet,202 the public also 
should be able to mentally associate an actual online service with a 
particular GDN before secondary meaning is properly established.  
Simply put, the GDN should be well known.  Traditional factors 
helpful in measuring the secondary meaning of GDNs may include 
sales success, significant advertising expenditures, and favorable 
evidence on brand recognition by consumers.203  An additional 
consideration should be the efforts exerted to make the GDN 
visible to the public, both online and offline, as is any other 
traditional trademark.  This may include the frequency of 
promotion on various media, such as on other Web sites, radio, 
television, magazines, newspapers, or billboards.204  Other useful 
factors involve the public’s affirmative actions to seek out the e-
company, as evidenced by the number of “hits” that the Web site 
receives and the amount of unsolicited e-mails or letters that the e-
company receives from consumers.205 
2. Finding Signs of Confusion 
Under the proposed claim, secondary meaning is evaluated in 
tandem with likelihood of confusion.  While all of the above 
factors establishing secondary meaning may demonstrate that 
consumers are extremely familiar with <pets.com>, it does not 
necessarily follow that consumers who nevertheless purchase from 
 
202 See supra note 16; see also Akhtar & Cumbow, supra note 159, at 228 (suggesting 
that the public appreciates that “.com” indicates an e-company and, therefore, a single 
source). 
203 Traditional factors of secondary meaning include (1) sales success, (2) advertising 
expenditures, (3) studies on consumer recognition, (4) unsolicited media coverage, (5) 
attempts to plagiarize the mark, and (6) length and exclusivity of the mark’s use. See, 
e.g., Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 
1222 (2d Cir. 1987). 
204 See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 15:50, at 15-79 (suggesting that advertisements 
may create a mental association in the public’s mind, including the minds of individuals 
who never have purchased the goods). 
205 See Genesee Brewing Co., Inc. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 
1987) (referring to unsolicited letters that demonstrate that a large number of consumers 
identify plaintiff’s beer as “Honey Brown”). 
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<pets.net> mistakenly believe that they are purchasing from 
<pets.com>.  The factors pertinent to determining a likelihood of 
confusion, as discussed below,206 should be simultaneously 
considered to ascertain whether a GDN has secondary meaning.  In 
other words, a GDN that has secondary meaning is one in which 
the adoption of a similar domain name by an e-competitor would 
“constitute[] a representation that its goods come from the same 
source.”207  The requirements of the proposed cause of action are 
satisfied when a GDN is associated with its service in such a way 
that Internet consumers are likely to be confused by a competitor’s 
use of a similar domain name. 
a) Limitations on GDN Protection 
Before discussing the factors evincing a likelihood of 
confusion, it should be first pointed out that a showing of actual 
public confusion should not be overestimated, particularly when 
the confusion is nominal.208  So-called initial interest confusion 
should be insufficient to satisfy the second part of the proposed 
cause of action.  The concept of initial interest confusion has 
gained popularity in cases dealing with the Internet.209  This is the 
situation in which the adoption of a similar mark diverts 
consumers’ attention from the original source that they were 
seeking although by the time of purchase they are no longer 
confused.210  The Brookfield court asserted that the “diversion of 
consumers’ initial interest is a form of confusion against which the 
Lanham Act protects.”211  Using this reasoning, another court 
found that a “[d]efendant’s domain name and home page address 
are external labels that, on their face, cause confusion among 
 
206 See infra notes 219–17 and accompanying text. 
207 Genesee, 124 F.3d at 149–50. 
208 See infra note 219 (listing evidence of actual public confusion as a factor in 
analyzing unfair competition claims). 
209 See Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 
1062 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that by using <moviebuff.com> to divert people looking for 
“MovieBuff” products, the defendant “improperly benefits from the goodwill that 
[plaintiff] developed in its mark”). 
210 See id. 
211 Id. at 1063 (citing Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 
1043–46 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
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Internet users and may cause Internet users who seek plaintiff’s 
web site to expend time and energy accessing defendant’s web 
site.”212  Accordingly, the adoption of a similar domain name that 
operates to attract potential consumers’ interest may be actionable 
even though the consumers thereafter rectify any initial confusion. 
Liability for initial interest confusion alone is inappropriate 
because the experience of the Internet has trained millions of users 
to expect that they will not reach the Web sites that they want 
every time.  While an online consumer may land on the wrong 
Web site, often only a few seconds may pass before he or she 
realizes the mistake.  A consumer looking to purchase dog collars 
on <pets.com> may inadvertently land on the pet care newsletter 
Web site called <pets.org>, yet will not be confused in a way that 
should result in protection for <pets.com>.  Consumers have come 
to expect that locating a particular online pet supplier’s Web site 
may require some trial and error.213  Another example is where a 
consumer mistakenly types in or clicks on a link for 
<potatoe.com> to reach <potato.com>.  Recalling the concept of 
“pre-existing confusion” from the Holiday Inns case,214 the holder 
of <potatoe.com> may have intentionally adopted that GDN to 
catch poor spellers or oblivious consumers, but did not itself create 
that grammatical confusion.  With well over thirty-five million 
domain names in cyberspace,215 some imprecision in the process of 
locating desired Web sites is inherent in the experience of the 
Internet, regardless of the affirmative acts of the competing GDN 
holder.216  Although the Lanham Act seeks to protect consumers’ 
ability to distinguish among the services provided by competitors, 
 
212 Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1441 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (issuing an injunction in favor of the plaintiff, Planned Parenthood, 
against the defendant, the host of Catholic Radio, in order to dispel confusion induced by 
defendant’s domain name <www.plannedparenthood.com>). 
213 See generally Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1062. 
214 See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 621 (6th Cir. 1996); 
supra notes 135–41 and accompanying text. 
215 This amount includes “.com,” “.org,” “.net,” “.biz,” and “.info” domain names only. 
See supra note 18. 
216 Compare how the Brookfield court distinguished the Holiday Inns case: “[Defendant 
here] acted affirmatively in placing [plaintiff’s] trademark in the metatags of its web site, 
thereby creating the initial interest confusion.”  Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1065 (emphasis 
in original). 
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fleeting initial interest confusion on the Internet is of little concern 
and should not be actionable. 
The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Holiday Inns is helpful in that 
it speaks to the overall Internet experience—no one creates the 
imprecision in surfing the Internet for a particular Web site.217  
But, at the same time, this inherent imprecision should not excuse 
competitors from using deceptive trade practices or confusing the 
public.  The type of confusion that does raise the specter of 
concern is a long-term confusion as to source, particularly when 
the offending competitor provides similar services.218  For 
example, consumers are confused as to source when they fully 
believe that they are purchasing dog supplies from <pets.com>, but 
in actuality the services are rendered by <petz.com>. 
The traditional test for a likelihood of confusion typically 
involves several factors,219 three of which are the most probative to 
determining a likelihood of confusion in this context: (1) the 
similarity between the GDN and the competitor’s mark, (2) the 
proximity of the type of services, and (3) the competitor’s intention 
in adopting a similar domain name.220  First, because identical 
GDNs are not an issue,221 the similarity between respective domain 
names should be the focus.  For instance, <pets.net> is similar to 
<pets.com> in that the same SLD is used; and <petz.com> is 
similar to <pets.com> in that the alternate spelling does not change 
the way which Internet consumers would pronounce the domain 
 
217 See Nathenson, supra note 19, at 959–61 (describing the expectation of a typical 
Web surfer as “an educated guess, rather than an absolute expectation”). 
218 See 2-5 GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 31, § 5.01[3][c][iv], at 5-22 (defining 
confusion as to source as the situation in which the public mistakenly believes that it is 
purchasing goods manufactured by the original mark owner). 
219 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 286 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).  The 
Poloroid factors are (1) similarity of marks, (2) strength of plaintiff’s mark, (3) quality of 
the defendant’s goods or services, (4) proximity of the goods or services, (5) likelihood 
that plaintiff will bridge the gap, (6) evidence of actual confusion, (7) defendant’s good 
faith, and (8) consumer sophistication. See id. 
220 As the Brookfield court noted, the similarity of the marks and the proximity of the 
goods or services are “always important” in a likelihood of confusion analysis. 
Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054. 
221 See supra note 16. 
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name phonetically.222  Identical or similar phonetic pronunciation 
may cause public confusion particularly when the Web sites are 
verbally advertised, such as on the radio or television.223 
Second, where a domain name such as <pets.biz> is a direct 
competitor of <pets.com>, confusion is more likely.224  As the 
Brookfield court opined, “The use of similar marks to offer similar 
products accordingly weighs heavily in favor of likelihood of 
confusion.”225  On the other hand, if <pets.biz> is an online 
newsletter about pet care whereas <pets.com> is an online pet 
supply retailer, the adoption of <pets.biz> is less likely to confuse 
consumers who are looking to purchase particular pet supplies.226  
Even further, if <pets.biz> provides banking services, then a 
finding of confusion is much less likely.227 
Third, inquiring into <pets.biz>’s justification for adopting its 
domain name may lead to a presumption of a likelihood of 
confusion.228  If <pets.com> offers proof that <pets.biz> was 
intentionally trying to deceive the public, courts may presume that 
such deception resulted.229  Comparing elements of the respective 
domain names’ Web sites for similar colors, fonts, layouts, sound 
files, or login and checkout procedures also may be relevant in 
 
222 Cf. Nathenson, supra note 19, at 960 (explaining that a dispute arising over a domain 
name readily suggests that the domain names at issue are highly similar). 
223 Cf. Krim-Ko Corp. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of N.Y., 390 F.2d 728, 731–32 
(C.C.P.A. 1968) (stressing the importance of phonetic similarity when the goods are of 
the type frequently purchased by verbal order). 
224 See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1056. 
225 Id.; accord OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 188 
(W.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that where two e-companies “compete for the same 
audience—namely, Internet users who are searching for a web site that uses [a] 
plaintiff[’s] mark as its address”—such a “high degree of competitive proximity increases 
the likelihood of confusion among Internet users”). 
226 See supra notes 224–22. 
227 See id. 
228 See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 23:110, at 23-273 to 23-275.  Other courts 
suggest that a defendant’s bad faith creates only an inference of confusion rather than a 
presumption. See, e.g., Res. Developers, Inc. v. Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Found., 
Inc., 926 F.2d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that when bad faith is shown, “a powerful 
inference may be drawn that the defendant has succeeded in confusing the public”). 
229 See 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 13, § 23:110, at 23-273 (explaining that proof of 
intended confusion tends to show confusion in fact). 
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determining whether <pets.biz> acted in good faith.230  For 
instance, if <pets.biz> displays its name on its Web site by 
emphasizing the “.biz”—i.e., the dissimilar portion of the mark—
in large, bold, blinking font, then such efforts to distinguish its 
domain name would weigh in its favor.231  In addition, the 
presence of an obvious and effective disclaimer may be indicative 
of good faith or an effort to distinguish services.232 
b) Confusion by Offline Competitors 
Another type of confusion, confusion as to association, may 
arise when offline competitors adopt names that are similar or 
identical to online GDNs.233  If <pets.com> has acquired secondary 
meaning, then the public is likely to be confused as to association 
when a store called “Pets.com” or even “Pets.com Offline” opens 
down the street.234  In addition to the similarity of the marks, one 
of the factors that should weigh most heavily in determining 
likelihood of confusion in this scenario should be whether the 
GDN holder will “bridge the gap” in services.235  As one court 
explained, “This factor contemplates ‘the senior user’s interest in 
preserving avenues of expansion and entering into related 
fields.’”236  Pets.com Offline may argue that it is providing pet 
supplies in a different market than <pets.com>, namely the offline 
 
230 See 3 id. § 23:52 (stating that the use of the same lettering, colors, and format weighs 
in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion). 
231 See 3 id. § 23:42 (“Although it is not proper to dissect a mark, one feature of a mark 
may be more significant and it is proper to give greater force and effect to that dominant 
feature.  Thus, as a preliminary to comparing marks in their entireties, it is not improper 
to downplay the similarity of very descriptive parts of conflicting marks.”). 
232 Compare Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 1325, 1330 (2d Cir. 
1987) (suggesting that the use of disclaimers can cure confusion effectively in markets 
comprised of sophisticated consumers), with Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/Movie 
Channel, Inc., 832 F.2d 1311, 1316 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the burden to prove that a 
disclaimer is effective is placed on the defendant). 
233 See 2-5 GILSON & SAMUELS, supra note 31, § 5.01[3][c][iv], at 5-22 (describing 
confusion as to source as the situation in which the public believes that the offending 
mark is associated or connected with the original mark). 
234 See id. 
235 See Lexington Mgmt. Corp. v. Lexington Capital Partners, 10 F. Supp. 2d 271, 286–
87 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); supra note 219. 
236 Lexington Mgmt. Corp., 10 F. Supp. at 287 (quoting Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim 
Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 504 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
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market.  But if <pets.com> has demonstrated that it is likely to 
expand its online services and offer the same services in a physical 
location in Manhattan, then a finding of a likelihood of confusion 
may ensue. 
Furthermore, the intention of Pets.com Offline in adopting its 
name would be questionable and may trigger a presumption of 
confusion.237  Even if it had a credible justification for adopting a 
similar name, however, the well-known Dawn Donut rule 
establishes that if “expansion were probable, then the concurrent 
use of the marks would give rise to the conclusion that there was a 
likelihood of confusion.”238  An e-company holding a GDN with 
secondary meaning, therefore, may be protected from unfair 
competition by its brick-and-mortar competitors if it intends to 
cross over to the offline world. 
B. Fashioning an Equitable Remedy 
When a competitor is likely to cause consumer confusion, it 
should be required “‘to use every reasonable means to prevent 
confusion’ as to the source of the products.”239  As discussed, 
issuing injunctions raises fears that the holder of <coffee.com> 
effectively would gain a monopoly over the generic term “coffee” 
in other domain names.240  The Genesee court acknowledged that a 
competitor’s use of a generic term may not be enjoined 
altogether.241  Rather, the holder of a GDN should be entitled to an 
equitable remedy that is “no broader than necessary to cure the 
effects of the harm caused.”242  The sensible remedy is to require 
the offending competitor to distinguish its services and explicitly 
notify consumers that its services do not come from or are not 
associated with those of the prevailing GDN holder.243 
 
237 See text accompanying supra notes 228–29. 
238 Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959). 
239 Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 150 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(quoting Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121 (1938)). 
240 See supra Part III.B. 
241 See Genesee, 124 F.3d at 151. 
242 Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 1325, 1329 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(citing Swann v. Charlotte–Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)). 
243 See Genesee, 124 F.3d at 151 (quoting Forschner Group v. Arrow Trading Co., 30 
F.3d 348, 359 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
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The offending competitor could distinguish its services by 
differentiating the appearance of its Web site, which may include 
calling attention to the dissimilar portion of the GDN everywhere it 
appears on the Web site—by using large fonts, bolding, or 
underlining, for example.244  An explicit notification also should be 
required in the form of a full disclaimer, as opposed to a hyperlink 
to the disclaimer, placed at the top of each page of the Web site so 
that it is quickly noticeable while the page is loading.245  Although 
disclaimers may not be effective in some traditional contexts,246 
their utility may be greater online because Internet consumers are 
already sensitized to the fact that they will not always land on the 
right Web sites.  A disclaimer on <pets.biz> may dispel any 
confusion quickly and aid consumers along in their search for 
<pets.com>.  A hyperlink to the prevailing GDN holder’s Web site 
additionally should be provided alongside the disclaimer to direct 
lost Internet consumers.247 
As for offline competitors that are found to have caused a 
likelihood of confusion as to association,248 courts should grant an 
injunction in favor of prevailing GDN holders.  Still, <coffee.com> 
should not be able to prevent “Coffee Co.” or “Coffee Offline” 
from opening on Fifth Avenue.  But if an offline competitor takes 
on “Coffee.com” or “Coffee.com Offline” as its name, which later 
results in confusion to the public because <coffee.com> is taken in 
its entirety, then injunction may serve as a reasonable remedy. 
CONCLUSION 
The present scheme of intellectual property protection under 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act can provide the proper analytic 
framework for addressing GDNs.  A policy change removing the 
 
244 See supra Part IV.A.2.a. 
245 But see Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/Movie Channel, Inc., 832 F.2d 1311, 
1315–16 (2d Cir. 1987) (reviewing academic literature that concludes that disclaimers, 
which utilize negating words such as “no” or “not,” are frequently ineffective). 
246 See id. (referring to scientific research demonstrating the lack of effectiveness of 
disclaimers placed on football jerseys). 
247 See Nathenson, supra note 19, at 961 (suggesting that hyperlinks that forward 
Internet users to their desired Web sites may alleviate confusion). 
248 See supra notes 233–35 and accompanying text. 
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stigma of GDNs as generic marks is first needed, however, in order 
to deal effectively with the reality of the Internet and the ability of 
GDNs to function as true trademarks.  The uniqueness of GDNs 
has been a dominant theme in this Note’s analysis and ultimately 
urges the conclusion that GDNs should be protectable upon a 
showing of secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion of 
Internet consumers.  The application of the genericness doctrine is 
wholly inappropriate in the context of these novel, yet source-
identifying marks.   
The proposed remedy preserves fair competition and helps to 
allay concerns over monopoly, while also alleviating confusion 
within the Internet community.  Safeguarding the substantial 
efforts of GDN holders in creating and developing goodwill, under 
this proposal, comports with language of the Lanham Act while 
faithfully upholding its fundamental goals. 
 
